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CHAPTER

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

In a capitalist

economy, economic

1

AN ONGOING BUSINESS

IN

activities take place in

two basic ways.

Transaction between individuals or independent contractors and transactions within
a firm.

'

The

substitution of firm instead of independent contractors

related to the cost associated with the latter.

2

If the cost

is

essentially

of allocation of resources

through markets

is

greater than the costs of allocation of resources by central

authority (which

is

essential for a firm or corporation)

place within a firm rather than across markets.
in the allocation

3

of resources for production of goods and services.

business relationships because

it is

demand how each

4

Uncertainty

5

Complexity

arises

other should respond to a particular situation.

the contracts are shorter, complexity and uncertainty do not create
if the

'Stephen.

Id.

'Id.

"Id.

'Id.

6

Id.

is

inevitable in

when
6

of

parties try

If the terms

much

of

costs, but

terms of the contracts are longer, they increase the complexity and uncertainty

M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and The ALl Corporate Governance

G.W.L.Rev. 1034, 1053 (1993)
2

"These costs

difficult to foresee the future conditions

the parties involved in business transactions".
to

activity will take

There are variety of costs incurred

include costs created by uncertainty and complexity.
all

economic

Project.

61

2
in a business transaction

and hence increase

costs.

7

Thus,the firm

one alternative

can reduce uncertainties and complexities by providing a centralized decision

that

making body (which

which has the power

the ultimate authority)

is

various factors of production should be utilized by a firm.
is

is

a nexus or team of contracts with a centralized decision

constantly rewrites the terms of the contract.

As

who

is

its

success,

it

is

how

In other words,the firm

making body which

9

said above, since a centralized decision

corporation's functions and

8

to direct

making body

is

crucial for a firm or

appropriate to consider at this point,

appropriate to form the centralized decision

making body

(that

is,

who

should be composed of the centralized decision making body?) and what are the
functions of such body?

making power

Traditionally, the decision

The board of

resides in the board of directors.

10

dominated by shareholders does not seem optimal because

directors

most of the shareholders join the corporation with the main purpose of making
profit (profit maximization).

strategies.

Hence divergent

Bainbridge, Supra note

I

prefer instant profit.

Others

may

prefer long-

12

among

interests

implementing corporate

7

Their interests in making profit differs from one

Some may

shareholder to another.

term buy and hold

11

strategies.

13

shareholders create disagreement on
Further, in the

modern corporate

context,

at 1053.

'Id
"Id.

10

MELVIN

ANALYSIS.

A.

EISENBERG,

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION A LEGAL

Part 3 (1976).

RICHARD A. POSNER, KENNETH
SECURITIES REGULATION. 60.
"

12

13

Bainbridge, supra note

Id

1,

at

1055.

E.

SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION

LAW AND

3

diffusion of ownership of stock has created a situation where shareholders do not

much

take

hence

interest in a particular firm.

Generally, shareholders dislike risk and

try to hold diversified portfolios rather than concentrate in

running the corporation. Even
quickly

sell

corporation.

if the

corporation

is

on the verge of collapse, they

off their stocks instead of fighting and helping to reorganize the failing
15

board dominated by senior executives (top managers)

the corporation.

Much

may be

They

invest considerable time

work

corporations do not do similar

Thus more they

firm specific their

upon

human

capital

is that, if

and

17

16

become.

made by them

as their involvement with

greater than the others.

executives

is

removed from

day

competition

their positions

4

POSNER, SCOTT,

5

Bainbridge, supra note

6

Id.ai

supra note
1

at

to

11.

1055

1056.

POSNER, SCOTT, supra

note 11 at 60

more

the

Further, they gain easy access to
are

much more informed and can be

day operation of the business

among

is far

in appointing senior

senior executives themselves, then

by lower managers

"id.
8

other

effort in learning the job,

The most important aspect

there

when

perhaps they are the best ones to control the board of directors.
will be

effort in learning

or the corporation has a unique corporate

invest their time

information and the decisions
relied

and

of their knowledge gained by such learning (effort and time) will

be specific to the corporation for which they work, especially

culture.

beneficial to

In fact, seventy-five percent of the senior executives are long-term

employees of the corporation.
their job.

one or few

Thus, shareholders often lack the incentive to be actively involve in

corporations.

A

14

if

18

However, they

"markets for securities

4

and managerial labor give poor signals as

The

example

classic

IBM

for this situation

The company's stock

confidence

company

20
.

the massive changes

relied mostly

corporation.

and

Further, if lower

the corporation, they

in

computer company

began

to lose

The

Further

it

delayed in getting into markets

computers and super computers", which were growing

The company was forced

22

19 "

on markets for "main frame computers and os/2" but

fired inefficient executives,

chairman.

largest

This was mainly due to bad speculations by the management.

for" portable personal
21

which took place

price started sliding and investors

markets for such computers did not grow.

rapidly.

performance of the corporation.

Machines Corp), the worlds

(International Business

in 1993.

is

to the

may be

to cut its

finally the

work force,overhaul management,

company

managers are also
the

hired

its first

outsider

in competition for the top places in

most informed and responsive

critics

of the

23

However, the board consisting of senior executives

is

not perfectly faithful.

24

Generally, "senior executives have less incentive to maximize wealth as they cannot
retain all

of the profits

they are successful and will not suffer

if

They tend

should the venture flop".

and perquisites.

25

20

21

As

it

One way

POSNER, SCOTT, supra

note

1 1

Adapt

to

how

at 28.

IBM Faces Giant Task In Reinventing Itself: Many challenges facing
New World.The Financial Post,Dec 19, 1992 at SI 4.

23

PONER,SCOTT, supra

note

Bainbridge, supra note

1

at

1 1

can

at 60.

Michael Urlocker,
Tries to

supra note 20

25

Thus,

to reduce shirking is to include outside directors in

Reversal offortune, Information Week, Feb 10,1993,

22

24

of the losses

have an incentive to consume excess leisure

In other words, they have the tendency to shirk.

you reduce shirking?

19

to

all

Bigblue

at 60.

1057

Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Van. L.Rev. 1259

at

1262 (1982)

5

the board.

26

The main

task of the outside directors

is

performance of the senior executives (management)

and stimulate the

to oversee

27
.

There are advantages and

disadvantages in appointing outside directors to monitor the performance of the
senior executives.

The disadvantages

in appointing outside directors in the

board are that most

independent directors have "full-time employment elsewhere that
their attention

and provides the bulk of

their pecuniary

and psychic income." 28

"They neither have the time nor the information necessary"
ordinary business of the corporation.

29

appoints lawyers and bankers as outside directors

bankers

may

who

to be involved in the

Further sometimes, the outside directors

are compelled to be under control of the insiders.

the corporation or

commands bulk of

For instance,

who

with and support management interests and

its

a corporation

already provide services to

intent to provide services in the future

be reluctant to go against the corporation.

if

30

such lawyers and

They tend

viewpoints.

to identify

Outside directors are

almost instinctively pro-management. The Board of directors of Multi Media Inc,

can be taken as an example. The company
is

losing revenue.

The Chairman Walter

is

Bartlett is reluctant to

keep the company out of possible takeover).
side directors (five of

them

showing signs of takeover target as

The board which

it

make changes(to
consists

are part of Greenville establishment-Multi

of nine out

Media

Inc

was formed by a merger between two Greenville media establishment, Greenville
News-Piedmont Co and South Eastern Broad Casting Corp) have
attitude as the

25

27

28

29

30

management.

POSNER, SCOTT, supra

Some

note

1 1

Id.at 60.

Bainbridge.swpra note
Id.

Id. at

1059

1

at

1058

at

insiders of Multi

Media

the

same cautious

Inc expressed the

view

6
that the

Even

Board's cautious attitude

if the

may

be

31

later detrimental to the corporation.

outside directors are not actually biased in favor of the insiders, there

will be structural bias,

32

when

special litigation

committees are formed

to halt

shareholders derivative actions against officers or directors of the corporation. This
is

because" outside directors are generally corporate officers or retirees

same views and values

the

going against their

own

the incumbent board

as insiders."

Hence, they cultivate an attitude of not

passively elected by the shareholders".

structure biases the selection process towards directors

support the existing directors can rely.

However, there are
in the board.

Initially,

certain factors

we cannot

share

Further, outside directors are "nominated

colleagues.

members and

33

who

by

This

on whose cooperation and

34

which favor the inclusion of outside directors

categorize

all

directors as biased (actually or

structurally)"since outside directors have greater incentives to monitor

actively and to discipline poor managers.

If the

company

monitorship, their reputation and future employability

is

fails

management

under their

likely to suffer."

35

Further, empirical evidence suggests that inclusion of outside directors in the board

minimizes shirking

that

outweighs the costs entailed in their use.

However, the board should not be composed only of outside

36

directors.

Some

scholars suggest that the inclusion of consumers, suppliers and cohabitants will be
beneficial to the corporation.

disadvantages too.

31

May
3:

33

34

For instance,

if

ultimate consumers are allowed to represent the

Anita Sharpe, Sedate Multi Media Inc
10,1994,

at

Al

Bainbridge, supra note
Id.

Id. at 1060.

35

Id.
36

Inclusion of such constituencies in the board has

Id. at

1064.

1

at

1059

home of Phil

&

Sally Faces unclear Future, WA11. ST.J.,

7

board, they

mind

is

may

be less interested in the growth and continuity of the firm as their

usually on the market place where they ultimately pay for the product.

There are other ways

to

improve consumer

interests

such as easy access to

information, stimulating competition and implementing laws which penalizes

producers of dangerous or fraudulent products.

Who

should comprise of the board of directors

American Law

Institutes tentative draft

No.

Corporate law should provide that

(a)

37

1,

is still

a debatable question.

Sec. 3:03 states as follows:

at least

The

38

a majority of the directors of

a large publicly held corporation shall be free of any significant relationship

with the corporations senior executives unless a majority of the corporations
voting securities are

As

(b)
is

owned by

a single person or a family group.

a matter of good corporate practice, a publicly held corporation that

required under subdivision (a) to have a majority of directors

free

who

are

of any significant relationships with the corporations senior executives
at least three such directors.

should have

The above

Round Table

section reflects the present day corporate practice.

The Business

statements require a "board comprising of a majority of outside

directors at least in the absence of a controlling group

and the corporate directors

guide book also recommends this structure. Reliable data from variety of sources

shows

that the concept

practice."

embodied

in Sec. 3:03 has

begun

to take firm hold in

39

However,

it

should be noted that modern corporate practice does not totally

prohibit the inclusion of senior officers of the corporation to be

on the board. As

discussed earlier, the inclusion of senior executives on the board provides greater
benefits to the board and to the corporation as a whole.

37

ALFRED

F.

CONARD,

Hence

Reflections on Public Interest Directors,

this

author suggests

75 Mich L.Rev. 941,959

(1977).

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, TENTATIVE DRAFT NO.l, Part
38

111 71 (1982).
39

AMERICAN LAW

INSTITUTE, supra

note 37

at 72.

8
that a

board comprised of outside directors, senior executives, and shareholders of

the corporation

and

ideal for the corporations functions

is

its

success.

Outside

directors will not alone guarantee successful board function. There should be a

balance of participation of constituencies discussed above. This composition will

provide

high level of efficiency for the corporation as a whole.

40

Functions of the board of directors:

"Under the
function

was vested

was embodied
affairs

traditional legal

model of management

board of directors"

in the

in a central provision

of a corporation

shall

41
.

structure, the

managing

This aspect of traditional model

of many corporate

statutes.

"The business and

be managed by a board of directors".

It

has become

increasingly clear however, that in a typical publicly held corporation, the board

does not "manage" the corporations business in the ordinary meaning of that term.
Rather the function

is

vested in the senior executives.

The main function of

the board of directors

is

42

the selection, monitoring,

removal, and replacement of the principal senior executives.

of managing the corporations business

is

43

"Since the function

normally performed by the senior

executives, the selection, and removal of these executives are in a sense the boards

most important function."
"the corporation

is

41

42

43

Fischel,

supra

at

It is

the obligation of the board

efficiency".

45

"

This function

1263.

AMERICAN LAW

INSTITUTE,swpra note 32

at

60,61

Id.

AMERICAN LAW

44

Id.

"Id.

to

make

sure that

a viable economic unit, and that the resources are being

managed with maximum

40

44

INSTITUTE, supra

note 32

at 63.

is

usually performed not

9
directly

by managing the corporation but indirectly by selecting the top managers,

evaluating their performance and removing or replacing any person

meet reasonable expectations."

By

who does

not

46

practice and law, the board elects the officers of the corporation.

47

In

electing the senior executives, the incumbent chief executive officer plays an

important role.

Since generally his knowledge of the day to day operation of the

business and suitability of candidates to function as officers carries greater weight
as he has

board.

and will have much more involvement with each

48

has been suggested by

It

some

scholars that

"

as a

officers, than the

good corporate

the candidates for senior executive offices should be reviewed

practice

by a board consisting

of non officers of the corporation and majority of them should have no significant
relationship with senior executives."

49

They consider

independent review as one

of the matters of good corporate practice.

The board not only

When

the same.
the

power

to

selects the officers

the board finds inefficient performance

remove such

officers

The removal function of
function as

it

of the corporation, but

who

it

also

removes

by the management

the board has greater importance than the selection

undertakes another function called monitoring the performance of
50

proper exercise of this function depends on the independence of the board.

46

47

EISENBERG, supra
Id.

at

.

The
That

is

must be completely independent from the management of the corporation

Id. at 64.

48

has

cause inefficiency and incompetency.

existing officers and the subsequent results produced by such performance

the board

it

note 10

at 164.

163.

49

AMERICAN LAW

50

EISENBERG, supra

INSTITUTE, supra note 32
note 10

at

164.

at 64.

10
since their performance

is

the

main focus of monitoring.

51

The

effective function

of monitoring depends on the adequate and continuing flow of information about
corporations financial status,

its

day

the information obtained should be

gathering system" and directors
financial

and nonfinancial

"An important

data."

to

day

activities

and future strategies further

from sophisticated and "independent information

who

are equally "sophisticated in interpreting both

52

aspect of the monitoring function

to take reasonable steps to

is

oversee compliance with specific bodies of rules imposed by law or by standards of
the corporation such as rules

main

on

responsibility of the board

self dealing or the antitrust laws"
is

not

to insure that

53
.

Here the

violations of the law or the

standards of the corporation do not take place, but to assure that programs which

promote compliance of such

rules or standard are being

implemented 54

.

For

instance in every publicly held corporation there should be an appropriate

focusing on "disclosure and review of self interested transactions."
rules

and standards of the corporation

that should be subject to

depends on the size of the corporation, the nature of

which

the business interfaces with government.

The second major function of
corporate plans and policies.

the board

is

its

55

program

The other

compliance program

business and the

manner

56

to

review and approve major

This function includes the formulation of "long-term

strategic plans such as mergers, acquisitions, investment budgets, annual capital

51

52

53

54

56

!66

Id.

at

Id.

at 165.

AMERICAN LAW
Id. at

INSTITUTE, supra

note 32

at 65.

INSTITUTE, supra note 32

at 66.

66

AMERICAN LAW

in

and

11

operating budgets, and targeted rates of return."
initiate alternative plans, to

propose

The boards reviewing function

is

new

57

The board

also has the

power

to

plans and to disperse an existing plan.

useful for efficient decision

the plan initiators (mostly senior executives) to be

more

making

as

it

makes

careful in their

CO

.

preparation.

Apart from the above two major functions, there are additional functions of the
board of directors which also should be taken into consideration.
function

that

is

corporation.
operation.

day

to

59

60

of providing advice

However,

to senior executives or officers

this function is

The senior executives could

get advice

from

own

staff for their

knowledge, expertise,

Additionally, the senior

from the corporation's lawyers, accountants,

and bankers rather than from the board except

who

their

staff has greater

and familiarity with the daily operation of the business.

consists of directors

of the

hardly essential to the corporation's

day operation of the business as the

officers could obtain outside advice

One such

are professionals.

61

in situations

However

where the board

itself

the board's advisory

function should not be altogether considered as unimportant.

The board being

part

of the corporate structure has a certain amount of familiarity with the business of
the corporation and the senior executives

may sometimes

be able to discuss matters

with the board which they cannot discuss with the subordinate officers.

57

58

59

Id

at

67

EISENBERG, supra
Id. at

note 10

at 158.

note 10

at

157

60

Id.

61

Id.
62

at 158.

EISENBERG, supra

157.

62

12

Functions of outside committees:
In order to support and implement monitoring functions of the board,

advantages to form outside committees.
into three categories; audit,

The outside committees can be divided

nominating and compensation committees.

committees should be composed exclusively of outside directors

who have no

significant relationship with the corporation).

The primary function of
to

employ an independent

the audit committee

auditor.

it is

would be

The committee

All three

(that is directors

63

to

recommend

also reviews the

the firm

performance of

such auditor, consults independent auditor and management, reinforces the

independence of such auditor.
"that

it

64

The

rationale behind forming audit

committee

is

maintains a continuing review of the corporations financial data and

accounting controls and maintaining a continuing dialogue with those responsible
for their preparation".

since the board

is

In theory the board itself can

supposed

to

However, "an audit committee

implement these functions

have a thorough knowledge of these functions. 65
constitutes a preferable

forum

for

performing these

functions because reviewing and approving of financial data and accounting
control" can

consume too much time of

the

whole board of

directors.

66

Further,

such a committee strengthens the independence of the corporation's outside auditor

and thereby helps assure
process.

that the auditor will

have

total

independence

in the audit

67

Finally,

an audit committee creates a "forum for regular, informal and private

discussion between the independent auditor and outside directors. In the absence of

63

AMERICAN LAW

64

Id.

65

66

67

at

INSTITUTE, supra note 32

at 82.

INSTITUTE, supra note 32

at 88.

83

Id

at 87.

Id

at 88.

AMERICAN LAW

13

such a forum, the independent auditor will not have a chance to meet the board
unless a problem of great magnitude arises.

encourages the independent auditor to

manner and allows

68

The formation of

raise potentially crucial issues in a timely

the auditor to deal with sensitive

and gives him or her the assurance
disagreement with management."

69

that

it

problems

affairs.

circumstances, but three

committees work done.

70

is

in a private fashion

can" really get a hearing in the event of

However,

to these benefits, the audit

committee should be comprised of outside directors who have
experience in financial

audit committee

sophistication and

The number of members must vary with the

probably the

minimum

required in order to

get the

In order to perform such functions, "the committee

should normally review on a periodic basis, the adequacy

of the corporation's

accounting and financial personnel resources and should also review the effect of

any important new pronouncements of the accounting profession and other
regulatory bodies."

71

Like the audit committee, "the nominating committee serves to implement and

"The monitoring function requires

support the monitoring function of the board.

objective evaluation of the performance of the senior executives and the nominating

committee helps

to assure this function "partly

by providing an independent locus of

by

its

responsibility for the selection

of directors and the composition of the board."

is "to

recommend candidates

directorships to be filled by the shareholders or the boards.

68

69

Id.

Id. at

70

at 95.

Id.

at 94.

71

72

88,89.

Id.

AMERICAN LAW

INSTITUTE, supra note 32

and nomination

72

The primary function of nominating committee
all

screening process and partly

at 101.

This function has

for

14
particular importance because in the

by the board

is

the "candidates

nominees

usually equals to election."

recommended by

in the corporation's

recommended by

candidates

recommended by

73

Generally

the committee and

list

the committee.

the committee"

to the board."

75

It

the board

would accept

those candidates as

proxy materials. The board does not accept
It

may

reject

its

all

own

the

one or two candidates

74
.

The committee may implement "procedures

Further,

nominees

modern publicly held corporation nomination

for identifying potential

also considers candidates for the board

proposed by

the chief executive officer or other senior officers or any director or

shareholders.

76

The committee may review

adequacy of information furnished
etc.

the "functions of directors,

the

compensation of directors,"

to directors, the

77

The composition of nominating committee should be of
employees of the corporation

officers or
directors).

78

(in other

directors

who

are not

words, should be outside

Although, officers and employees are not permitted to

sit

on the

nominating committee, they are not barred from "playing an active role in the
nominating process.

79

The

officers of the corporation, particularly chief executive

officer can play an active role in"

recommending and discussing candidates with the

committee and recruiting candidates for the board."

73

Id. at 103.

74

Id.
75

80

Id

at

at

103.
104.

76

Id.
77

Id.

at

78

Id. at

98,99

Id. at

102.

79

80

105,106.

AMERICAN LAW

INSTITUTE, supra note 32

at 102.

The

participation of the

15

chief executive in the nominating process
quality individuals as directors."

is

very

vital for the selection

81

The compensation committee, though not presently required by law,

common

feature of

of "high

most large publicly held corporations. 82

should be solely of outside directors, since

its

is

a

composition

Its

principle purpose

is to

"maintain a

continuing and detail review of the various forms of compensation paid to senior
executives."

83

Especially in large publicly held corporations, the vital role that

senior executives play
at the

makes

it

imperative that they be adequately compensated, but

same time compensation of senior executives should depend on

and performance.

their abilities

84

The primary function of

the compensation committee

is

to

"review and approve

the annual salary, bonus and other benefits, direct and indirect of the senior

executives.

Generally, the committee

would

itself

determine the chief executive

compensation and review the proposals of the chief executive or the staff

officers'

concerning the compensation of the senior executives."

85

Further, the committee submits to the board of directors'

regarding

new

recommendations

executive compensation programs, continuously reviews the

operation of the corporations executive compensation programs to determine

whether they are properly coordinated and "recommends changes

to

any executive

compensation program which yields payments and benefits that are not reasonably

81

Id.

at 103.

Id.

at 108.

Id.

at

109,110.

Id.

at

110

Id.

at

111.

82

83

84

85

16
related to executive performance or otherwise operates in

originally contemplated."

86

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,™/*™

note 10

at

111, 112.

a

manner

that

was not

CHAPTER

2

THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

IN

RELATION TO

CONTROL TRANSACTIONS

Corporate control transactions

The term corporate

control has several meanings.

scholars as "the group of individuals
the control."

87

It

official relation

office holder

89

also has

or

more

who

been referred

It

has been referred to by

for practical purposes

to as the office

may be

of the corporation,

precisely a fiduciary relationship existing

and the corporation.

regarded as
88

an

between the

90

Generally corporate control transactions are changes in corporations structure,

such as "setting up

new

divisions, acquiring another corporation or being acquired

by another corporation, increasing and decreasing leverage, going public or
selling stock or

markets."

buying

it

private,

back, buying or selling plants, entering or leaving

91

The primary motive underlying corporate

control transactions

is

the desire for

growth of the corporation. However some transactions are motivated "by the desire

87

DAVID C. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL- A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 98
88

Id.
89

Id.
90

Id. at

99

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, DANIEL
CORPORATE LAW 109 (1982)
91

R.

17

FISCHEL, THE

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

18
to

reduce the number of competitors" and some are to" generate synergistic effects,

resulting

from a complementarily of resources possessed by the combining

corporations as where

company "A"

while company "B"

strong in research but

is

is

strong in distribution but

weak

in distribution."

Control transactions produce gains to the corporation.
successful business in the 1980s.

According

weak

93

It

to the estimation

in research,

92

has been a

of the chief

economist of the securities and exchange commission, shareholders of target firms
in successful tender offers

from 1981 through 1986 received payments

$54

of their holdings before the tender

billion over the value

such gain from control transactions

is

that

it

offers.

94

of

in excess

Further one

reduces agency costs, generally

managers "do not always maximize the wealth of the investors" as they have only a
small

gain in the fortunes of the firm.

would

if

"Managers do not work as hard as they

they could claim a higher share of the proceeds.

may

perquisites and

consequences of

select inferior projects for the firm without bearing the

their actions."

costs

"when

made

in the incentive structure

better

They may claim excessive

Hence corporate control transactions reduce agency

managers obtain control of the firm's assets "or
given to the existing managers.

if alterations are

95

Sale of controlling blocks of stock (which falls under corporate control
also beneficial to the corporation.

transaction)

is

to setup his

own management team and

to gain

working arrangements with other firms."

92

WILLIAM

L.

CARY, MELVIN

A.

96

A

"new

sale

may

offers,

allow the purchaser

new

plans and

new

This in turn will reduce agency costs and

EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS-CASES

AND MATERIALS

1445 (5th edition 1980)
93

EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL,

94

Gregg A.

Jarrell,

supra note 91

at 112.

James A. Brickley, Jeffrey M. Netter, The Market For Corporate Control

;

the

Empirical evidence since 1980 2 Journal of Economic Perspectives 49. (winter 1988)
95

96

EASTERBROOK,FISCHEL,sw/>ra

note 91

at

112.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,

(1982).

91 Yale. L.

J.

698, 705

19
create gains to the corporation.

97

Furthermore, the purchaser pays a premium over

the market price in the belief that he can
profitably."

The premium

will be

"manage the

assets

some percentage of

of the firm more

the expected increase in the

value of the firms assets once the transfer of control becomes effective. If there

were no expected increase

in the value, the

corporate control transactions

moves

assets

Freeze out of minority shareholders
facilitates

a takeover.

The

of minority shareholders

management of

block of stock of the corporation).

up

Under

who do

is

99

Furthermore,

into

its

if the

99

at

control the

merged

by such

increase.

It is

not only

whole (including those who did not
by such

from the

increase.

may

By

sell

eliminating free-

regain the costs of

transfer of control."

100

Further,

716.
705.

Victor Brudney, Marvin A. Chirelstein,

A Restatement of Corporate Freeze

1357(1978).
100

who

share prices of the target corporation increases after

acquisitions by "appropriating the gains

Id

form of a

Essentially freeze out takes a

riding shareholders in a freeze out, the purchaser

98

a controlling

surviving parent corporation or into a shell

their stocks to the purchaser) will benefit

at

who own

freeze out, minority shareholders are compelled to give

the purchaser but the shareholders as a

Id.

that the elimination

The majority shareholders can be individuals or

the shift in control, then the purchaser will benefit

97

it

interest in the corporation is

the share holders

corporation especially formed for the purpose by those
entity

is

98

not participate actively in the

whose percentage

their equity interest in the corporation.

merger of a corporation

also beneficial to the corporation if

(that is shareholders

small) by majority shareholders (that

Hence

of the firm to "higher valued uses."

basic characteristic of freeze out

the corporation and

a parent company.

is

buyer will not pay the premium.

Easterbrook, Fischel, supra note 96

at

705

outs 87 Yale. L.J 1354,

20
"freeze out of minority shareholders in a long standing subsidiary will produce

gains if the value of the combined entity

is

greater than the total value of the

separate entities, the parent and the subsidiary."
to

economies of

scale, centralized

economies of information.
beneficial if

them

to

it

make

When

A

may

be due

management and corporate planning or

freeze out of minority shareholders of subsidiary

is

reduces the cost of monitoring "conflicts of interests and enables
additional cost justified investments."

publicly held corporation

becomes

This transaction produces gains.

transaction.

This increase in value

two

101

private,

it

One such

is

considered to be a control

gain

is

that

it

considerably reduces the "separation of ownership and control" which creates the
conflict of interest

transactions

may

between principal and agent.

102

More over going

private

eliminate costs which are inherent in public ownership.

These

costs include considerable "expenditures for legal and auditing fees, stockholder
relations

and compliance with mass disclosure obligations imposed by

organized stock exchanges."

103

Further,

by going private a firm can avoid

disclosure obligations which can be beneficial to the firm "if
sacrifice prospective business opportunities if disclosure

lower cost."

105

it

Managers who assign opportunities
from

their efforts

greater incentive to produce such gains.

Id.

at

102

Id. at
103

Id.
105

Id.

is

to

also beneficial to the

to

themselves can claim a

and therefore they have a

The manager can compensate

705, 706.

706

EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL,

104

might have

allows that "opportunity to be exploited more effectively or at a

greater portion of marginal gains

101

it

were required." 104

Allocating corporate opportunity to a corporate insider

corporation as

SEC and

supra note 96

at

706.

the firm

by

21

taking a lower salary and bonus and decrease in agency costs
beneficial."

may

be mutually

106

Fiduciary Principles and Corporate Control Transactions:

who must

Corporate directors are said to be fiduciaries

toward the beneficiaries of fiduciary
equity investors as a whole.

complex

sets

duties, that is to the corporation

As mentioned

is

Hence how do fiduciary

It is

duties

come

contracts cannot be written in greater detail

foresee the future well enough to resolve
difficult to specify all parties

obligations in the contract

itself,

(who

all

and

to the

in the first chapter, corporations are

of contracts, and generally "fiduciary principles are

contractual relations."

The answer

107

way

act in an honest

uncommon

in

into these contracts?

as

it

is difficult to

possible events well ahead of time.

are involved in the contracts) rights

108

and

The

especially the rights of the equity investors.

equity investors have the protection of fiduciary principles as they "bear the

marginal risks of the firm and therefore have the best incentives to
optimal investment and management decisions."

makes managers agents of
duties." In order to

directors

whole.

the

Hence "corporate contracts

the equity investors but do not mention the agents

make such an agency concept

agreeable to the equity investors,

must provide "careful and honest services

to the corporation as a

110

106

Id.

l01

109

make

Id

at

707.

at 90,

HENRY

G.

HENN, JOHN

R.

ALEXANDER,LAWS OF CORPORATION

sec 235,

629,627 3rd edition (1983).
108

109

Easterbrook, Fischel, supra note 91

EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL,

110

Id.

powers

HENN, ALEXANDER

in trust

and hence

it

at

90

supra note 91

at 91.

supra note 110. "Corporate managerial powers are considered to be

must be exercised honestly and

in

good

faith".

In an agency relationship, divergence of interests
directors or

managers share

from the equity investors."
one such way

interests,

is

in order to

more

the directors interests diverge

There are several ways to

1

control this divergence of

When

the sale of corporate control.

under the threat of sale of

perform well

in the enterprise the

imminent. The smaller the

is

its

keep

control, the

a corporation

is

managers of such corporation will

their positions intact.

But

this will "require

extensive and costly monitoring so that the investors and others

know how

well the

2
managers perform.""

However
It

fiduciary principle

is

an alternative to extra and costly monitoring."

replaces monitoring with precaution.

Fiduciary rules (which approximate the

bargain that investors and managers would have reached

bargained

at

no

cost) "preserve the gains resulting

management from
priority to their

fiduciary obligation

interests

is to

over those of investors.""

deter misconduct.

It

if

they could have

from the separation of

risk bearing while reducing the ability

own

3

4

of managers to give

One major

function of

implicitly monitors the conduct

managers, directors, and controlling shareholders."

of

5

Fiduciary principles imposes "anti-theft directives", restrictions on conflict of
interests

and exploitation of investors wealth by the management. However there

are limitations for these restrictions

which are contained

in the fiduciary principles

" Easterbrook, Fischel, supra note 91 at 91.
12

Id.

at 91, 92.

13

Id.

"Id.
"5

Paul N. Cox, Reflections on Exante Compensation and Diversification of Risks as Fairness

Justifications for Limiting Fiduciary obligations of Corporate Officers,

Shareholders. 60

Temp.L.Q 47

(1987).

Directors,

and Controlling

23
itself.

Limitations which distinguishes managerial practices that

practices that benefit

As mentioned

earlier, the

purpose of fiduciary principle
"7

may some

of the investors, the board

118

Hence

there

aspect of fiduciary duty

among

the welfare

is

equal treatment

a conflict between wealth maximization of

is

investors and equal treatment of investors.

division of wealth

maximize

In order to

times be required to distribute the wealth of

However one

the corporation unequally.

reduce high cost of

to

is

This purpose again can be broadly termed as

the maximization of the welfare of the investors.

of the investors.

investors and

managers and investors simultaneously."" 6

of managers.

direct monitoring

harm

Does

the investors or can

it

the board always stick to equal
distribute the wealth unequally, if

unequal distribution maximizes the wealth of the investors as a whole? If

we

consider the investors point of view, generally they "prefer a larger pie even if not

every one

may have

a larger slice."

principle their expected wealth

119

This

is

because under

this fiduciary

more and they always have

is

the possibility of

reducing any risk by "holding diversified portfolios of investments."
a corporate control transaction produce gains, and
distribution, then the expected wealth

a rule allowing unequal distribution."

if the

However many

Hence

"if

gains depend on unequal

of the investors as a whole

121

12 °

is

maximized

by

investors are risk averse.

For example, they prefer a definite $50 instead of waiting for "one in ten chance of
receiving"$500.

1,6

u7

118

119

120

Risk averse investors

EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL,

may

supra note 91

not be relevant if the market contains

at 91, 92.

Id. at 93.

Id. at 110.

Id. at 119.

Id.

Cox supra

note

115

at

81.

Risks of unequal

division of gain

from corporate control

transactions are diversifiable, At least in theory, particularly if such risks are unsystematic. Unsystematic
risk

is

121

defined as "risk that affect a given firm rather than firms generally".

EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL,swpra

note 91 at 119

24
risk neutral investors,

because they can

sell their risky

stocks to the risk neutral

investors and invest in instruments that do not contain the possibility of unequal
122

gain distribution.

If there is a "possibility

risky shares, every investor whether he

value maximizing rule.

As

is

of realizing the gains by

sale"

of

risk averse or risk neutral will prefer

123

in today's financial world,

most stocks are placed

funds, insurance companies, university

in

mutual funds, pension

endowments and other

financial

intermediaries which are alternative for risk neutral person, and this draws the

assumption that most investors are risk neutral.
markets are competitive,

this

124

Moreover when

capital

competition allows investors to agree to implement

wealth maximizing objectives because "greater wealth gives them the ability to

consume or rejuggle
But

their portfolios to give greater returns."

us not always consider only risk neutral investors are agreeable to

let

wealth maximizing

objectives.

maximizing

some of

rule for

rule for others,"

However
cheap

there

and

Even

Id

at

to

and

is

a limitation for this preference.

same time gain sharing

Only

if "contractual

remedies are

a self help protection" for risk averse investors, such as

may

prefer to the wealth maximization rule

unequal distribution of gains.

126

Diversification

120.

123

Id.
124

Id.
125

Id.
126

at the

wealth

which can be provided by contract (gain spreading devices).

if there is

which leads

risk averse investors "prefer

their investment

diversification, risk averse investors

122

125

EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL,

supra note 91

at 121.

allows risk averse

25
investors to "invest in a portfolio containing

themselves from the

risk."

many

separate securities and to protect

127

"Risks involved in corporate control are diversifiable."

128

Corporate control

transactions are many. "There are mergers, takeovers, freeze outs, tender offers,

going private transactions

would

profit

129

etc."

An

investor

who

from some transactions and lose from

has a diversified portfolio
others. Investors

diversified portfolios prefer unequal allocation of gains

the

allocation raises

number and amount of gain

with

as long as the unequal

transactions.

13 °

Further diversification allows the gains from corporate control transactions to be

divided unequally even
competitive.

131

The

when

investors are risk averse and markets are not

availability

of diversified investment portfolios allows risk

averse investors to find protection from risky investments and risk neutral investors

which may have the

risky stocks

to find

Hence "by holding a

possibility

of producing larger gains. 132

diversified portfolio containing the securities of

corporations, every shareholder has a chance of receiving gains

many

produced by

corporate control transactions, "not an equal chance but enough of a chance to

allow considerable diversification."

So

far this chapter dealt

133

with corporate control transactions, the benefits of such

transactions and the application of fiduciary duties in control transactions. Fiduciary

127

EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL,

modern

supra note 90

portfolio theory and capital

at

121.

asset pricing theory,

Cox supra
"Investment

note 115
in

at 53.

According to

an efficiently diversified

portfolio will virtually eliminate unsystematic risk.
128

Id.

at

122.

129

Id.
130

131

Id
Id

'"EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL,
133

Id.

Cox supra

note 115

chance of participating

supra note 91

at 55,

in the gains

at 124.

"Diversification provides a

means

of corporate control transactions.

to obtaining an equal exante

26
duties do not always

Unequal distribution of gains
interest.

Keeping

in

from control transactions.

require equal division of gains

mind

desirable if such distribution furthers shareholders

is

that

no shareholder be made worse

Thus

off.

shareholders generally prefer maximization of the amount of gains produced from

method of

control transactions and not the

The second

distribution of such gains.

part of this chapter deals with a specific case

corporate control.

The case

the board of directors

is

stresses the

view

that in a sale

134

which involves

of

of control the duty of

reasonably available

to obtain the best value

sale

to the

shareholders.

QVC

Network Inc v Paramount Communications

Inc:

In a nutshell, the basic principle underlying the decision in
that the duty

of a board of directors in a sale of control

reasonably available to the stockholders."
In this case the

is

Paramount case

is

the best value

to "obtain

135

Delaware supreme court held

that the "directors are obliged to

seek the best value reasonably available to stock holders whenever a corporation
undertakes a transaction that will cause either a change in corporate control or a
136

The court distinguished

breakup of the corporate

entity."

Viacom merger from

Time Warner merger.

the

In

the

Time Warner merger,

ownership of the combined company would have been given
of unaffiliated stockholders"

137

Paramount
the

to "a fluid aggregation

This ownership minimizes the risk of damaging

.

the long term strategic interests of the corporation and depriving the former

shareholders of their continuing interest in the corporation.

134

EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL,

135

Paramount Communication

136

supra note 91

Inc.

v.

QVC

However,

at 124.

Network /«c.,NO:427-28, 1994 WL3081, 2(Del. Supr.)

Meredith M. Brown, Gary W. Kubek, Paramount duties of directors, 8

137

Id.;

Paramount Communications

Inc.

v.

in

Time

Inc.,

571

A

2d 1150

No

3

PH-INSIT

(Del. 1990)

2,

(1994)

27

Paramount-Viacom merger one man [Mr. Redstone] would become the controlling
shareholder of the combined company.
controlling shareholder of the

power of

the voting

When

a single person

combined company

"there

is

the former public shareholders of the

becomes the

a significant reduction in

The new

company.

controlling shareholder can deprive the former public shareholders of their

continuing interest in the corporation through a cash out merger or can otherwise

long term strategic vision of the prior board of directors."

alter the

138

Hence the

court held that the public shareholders should be entitle to receive "a control

premium and\or
and

its

protective devices of significant value."

duty to seek best value arises only

bidding process seeking to
its

sell itself

However Paramount

MacAndrews

directors argued that under Revlon Inc. v

Inc. case, "a

139

a

if

company

&

Forbes Holdings,

initiates

an active

or in response to an unsolicited bid, abandons

longterm strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the breakup of

the company."
sale but

140

Further,

Paramount argued

was simply seeking

that

it

did not put the

to effect a strategic alliance with

give the Paramount shareholders a substantial interest in the

combined company.

Supreme courts on
controlling

141

the

company

shifts to a single

aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders.

138

139

140

l41

Brown, Kubek, supra note 136
Id..;

Paramount, 1994

506 A. 2d 173

Mat

3.

Viacom

that

for

would

equity of the

This argument was rejected by both Chancery and

the ground that the breakup of the

power of

company

WL

(Del.1986).

at 3.

30181

(Del.Supr.) at 7,8.

company

is

foreseeable if the

person rather than a fluid

28

Determination of best value available to the shareholders:
Although the court emphasized

made

"determine whether the directors
the court did give

some guidance

as to

The court expressed

view

the

strategic alliance.

However,

how

directors should proceed in determining

that "the

board

the board should try to quantify

comparison of the
will be received

142

not limited to considering only

is

totally the future

value of a

stock or other non-cash consideration

if

is

involved,

value, if feasible to achieve an objective

its

The board should focus on

alternatives.

to

a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision,

amount of cash involved and need not ignore

the

of the court was only

alternative provides the best value for stockholders."

which

it

that the important role

the value as of the date

by stockholders, because future actions by the new majority

shareholder could deprive minority shareholders of anticipated future growth in
that such value will

value, further the court noted

the assistance of experts using generally accepted

There are other considerations which has
offers such as "fairness

and

consummation, bidders

identity

The

the business

properly and in good

shown

142

143

144

145

to

judgment

have engaged

in self-dealing or fraud or

Brown, Kubek, supra note 136

at 4;

at

144

presumed

have been acted

their actions only

have acted

Paramount, 1994

to

WL

in

bad

when they
faith."

30181 (Del. Supr)

are

145

at 10.

10.

Gregory Milmoe, Troubled Directors

the Merger&Acquisition

of non-

rule in change of control transactions:

and are accountable for

at 4.

Id; Paramount

be assessed in considering alternative

rule, "directors are

Brown, Kubek, supra note 136

with

methods of evaluation." 143

and business plans."

judgment

faith,

be determined

feasibility, financing, legality, risk

application of business

Under

to

normally

Context,556

:

Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Troubled Companies in

PLI/Comm

167,9 (1990).

29

The decision

in

Paramount

change of control transaction

case,

will

makes

be

clear "that the boards actions in a

subject to enhanced scrutiny,

which involves

review by the court of both the adequacy of the boards decision making process

and the reasonableness of the substantive merits of the boards actions."

from the

test varies

rule, as

judgment

traditional business

rule,

146

This

under the business judgment

long as the directors act with due care, in good faith and in honest belief

that they are acting in the best interest

of the stockholders, the court gives great

deference to the substance of the directors decision and will not substitute
for those of the boards if the latter decision can be attributed to

business purpose.

its

views

any rational

147

"The impact of the enhanced scrutiny triggered by a change of control

Paramount

transaction also can be seen by comparing the

language in Time Warner.

" l48

In Time

test

with the courts

Warner no change of control was

involved, the court held that the directors "are not obliged to abandon a deliberately

conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there

no basis

to sustain the corporate strategy."

149

Further, in

Paramount

is

clearly

case, the

court also stressed the importance of process followed by the board and held that if
the decision taken by the board

and

impartial,

in the case

is

more

146

147

more

fully informed,

more

of a sale of control more open to the market

court will be less tempted to substitute
directors.

careful,

its

own

testing, the

decision to those of the

150

Brown,Kubek, supra note 136

at 4.

Id. at 4.

148

Id.
149

Id. at 5.
150

QVC

Network

Inc.

v.

Paramount Communications

Inc.,

635 A. 2d 1245,1270. (Del. Ch. 1993).
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In

Paramount

case, the court analyzed the conduct of the board of directors in

the sale of the corporation and concluded that
151

or result.

it

was not reasonable

was reasonable

In order to see whether "the board

as to process

as to process the

court invoked the general principle that directors have a duty to inform themselves,
prior to
to

making a business

them" but emphasized

decision, of

all

that the directors

diligent" in negotiating a sale or

material information reasonably available

must be extra careful or "especially

change of control.

152

In analyzing the

board's conduct, the court noted the boards failure to explore "whether

Viacom

offer

was

in fact superior to that

the court concluded that the directors uninformed process
strategic vision

With regard
analyzed

all

of

much of

its

credibility.

QVC

of QVC."

153

had deprived

their

and noshop provision the court

three provisions separately and held that the "termination fee

reasonable proportions should be defensible,
155

Finally,

154

to termination fee, stock option

does not unduly deter other bidders."

was

and the lack of information

likely to satisfy the financing conditions to its offer,

indicating that the

Paramount

if

Termination fee agreements will be struck

appropriate to induce a bid

it is

The court

of

and

further stated that:

down

if

they are product of disloyal

action or a grossly negligent process on the part of the board of directors.

In

Paramount agreed to pay to Viacom the $100 million termination fee
merger agreement with Viacom were terminated due to competing
transaction or if Paramount shareholders failed to approve the Viacom
transaction. I perceive no basis to conclude that in agreeing to this fee, the
this case,
if the

Paramount board breached any duty, including
best available transaction for the shareholders.

151

Paramount, 1994 WL30181

at

152

Brown, Kubek, supra note 136

153

Id

154

Paramount 1994

155

Brown, Kubek, supra note 136

156

QVC, 635 A. 2d

at

30181

1271.

duty to seek to achieve the

1.

at 5;

at 5.

WL

its
156

at 15.

at 5.

Paramount,l994 WL30181

at 9.

31

Second, "a stock option

is

more

likely to

be upheld

if

it

is

payable entirely

in

cash, and if any "put" feature has a cap that [combined with the termination fee]

reasonable in relation to the size of the transaction."

With regard
invalid

no shop

to

and unenforceable,

157

clauses, the court held that such clauses

if

is

may be

they prevent the target company's directors from

carrying out their fiduciary duties in considering unsolicited bids or in negotiating

for the best value reasonably available to the stockholders.

The court

158

stressed "that the bidders cannot gain vested contract rights in clauses

that are ultimately

found

to

have violated

the fiduciary duties of the target

directors.If such clauses violate the fiduciary duties of target directors,

held invalid and unenforceable."

it

's

will be

159

The Facts Of The Case:
"Paramount Communications Inc (herein
publicly held delaware corporation with

is

its

after referred to as

principal offices in

Paramount)

New York

is

a

City.

a global producer and distributor of entertainment with operations in motion

home

pictures television programming,

Paramount

is

also a leading

videos, theaters, sports and social events.

book publisher serving consumer education and

professional information markets in the United States and Internationally."

157

158

159

160

Brown, Kubek, supra note 136
Id; Paramount,

1994

Paramount, 1994

WL

QVC, 635

at

A. 2d

WL

at 6.

30181

30181

at 16.

at 16.

1246,1247.

I60

It
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compete

"In order to

the need to increase

a

its

in a rapidly

evolving global market place, Paramount

and financial strength." Hence Paramount wanted

size

felt

to

As

major media and communications company through mergers or acquisition.

result

be
a

Paramount' s advisors considered and evaluated the possibilities of mergers or

acquisitions of several video

media companies. In 1990, there was an arrangement

of a merger between Paramount and Viacom

[Delaware corp. which

Inc.

also

is

involved in entertainment and communication business] this arrangement was

merger would be an

in the belief

"

the assets of

Paramount and Viacom were a very good business

that such a

attractive transaction for

Viacom and

161

fit."

During such arrangement of merger between Paramount and Viacom,

Network Inc another delaware corporation having
Pennsylvania, [which

QVC] showed
informed

QVC

is

it

QVC

principle office in

the plaintiff in this action and herein after referred to as

signs of possible take over bid of

that

its

made

was not on

sale.

Paramount but Paramount

Paramount was solely interested

in

merging

with Viacom.
Later in September

executed.

1993, the original merger agreement with

The merger agreement "contained a no shop provision prohibiting

Paramount from

soliciting or considering

of $100 million payable

if

Viacom

if

the shareholders failed to approve the

recommended a competing

to

buy nearly

QVC, 635 A. 2d

at

20%

1248.

competing transactions, a termination fee

Paramount terminated the merger agreement as a

of a competing transaction or
the board

Viacom was

result

merger or

if

transaction and a lockup stock option allowing

percent of Paramount' s stock for $69.14 per share under

33
the

same conditions

as

would

trigger the termination fee.

usual terms of a lockup stock option,"

it

162

Apart from the

"

allowed Viacom to pay

but $1.00 per

all

share of the exercise price with a note of questionable marketability."

The
the

of the merger agreement was that

effect

Paramount public shareholders

by vesting an approximate
[National

Amusement

chairman and

CEO

Inc]

70%

to

entity.

shifted the voting control

from

Mr. Redstone [current chairman of Viacom]

NAI

voting interest in the combined corporation in

which Redstone

controls.

of Paramount would be the

CEO

Mr

Davis,

who

of the merged

is

the

entity.

would become minority shareholders

"Further, Paramount' s shareholders

merged

it

163

The merger agreement contained no provision

in the

would protect

that

the

former Paramount shareholders from being eliminated from the enterprise by means
of a cash out merger."

Meanwhile

QVC

164

network Inc proposed an acquisition of Paramount by

package price of $80 per share of

total

Paramount

share. Further

Paramount

officials

QVC

QVC

and discuss about a "merger

that

162

163

164

165

interested in negotiating with

Viacom merger provides

Id. at 1251.

Brown, Kubek, supra note 136

QVC, 635 A. 2d
Id

at

1252.

at

1252.

at

1

the best

fit

to

would be subject

negotiations and stockholder approvals and regulatory clearances."

stated "that the

at

shares plus $30 cash for each

chairman expressed his willingness

However, Paramount was not

it

for the

meet
to

165

QVC. Paramount

growth of Paramount

a

s

34
business" and hence delayed discussions with

delay

for

QVC

shares."

166

After

QVC

Paramount and Viacom amended

51%

to begin a tender offer for

its

announcement of the tender

's

original agreement, under

of Paramount' s shares

no-shop provision, termination

in the

announced a tender offer

at

to terminate the

in response to

QVC's

which Viacom was

$80 per

fee,

share, followed

that

would enable

hostile offer

meeting was held in response
conclusion that although the

contingent.

Viacom

raised

its

bid. later

QVC

to

QVC's

QVC's

higher tender offer.

also raised

price

is

higher than the

rather than authorizing

advisors to seek further information from

The main purpose of

the action

was

A

Viacom

to a

price, the offer

QVC

management or

offer based

the board's

QVC. 168

to diffuse all anti

takeover mechanisms

[noshop provision, lock up stock option, termination clause] and consider both

166

Viacom

]61

Id. at

w

offer [both competing offers] fairly

QVC, 635 A. 2d

Id. at

1254, 1255.
1257.

at

1254.

its

board

The board came

Therefore, the board simply rejected the

on the financing conditions

offer and

the

merger agreement before a shareholder vote." 167 Further,

cash tender offer to an amount more than Viacoms tender offer price.

was highly

by

and lock up stock option.

However, the agreement included a "fiduciary out" provision
board

offer,

The amended agreement did not contain any material

a stock for stock merger.

changes

Frustrated with Paramount'

against Paramount and "publicly

filed action

Paramount

QVC.

and on equal footing.

QVC

35

The Delaware chancery court on November 24 gave judgment

The court enjoined

the lockup stock option

cover Viacom's expenses and hence did not invalidate

communications

Inc.

the court of chancery

On

appeal, the

a fair liquidated

the

Paramount board and further held

QVC, 635 A. 2d

""Paramount,

WL

at

1270, 1271.

30181

at

1

to

169

supreme court of Delaware affirmed the

Paramount Viacom deal implicates enhanced

169

amount

was appealed by Paramount

the

170

QVC.

it."

chancery courts decision and held that the sale of control which

reasonable as to process or result.

of

and the no shop provision. With regard

to termination fee, the court held that "it represented

The judgment of

in favor

that the

is

judicial scrutiny

the

outcome of

of the conduct of

conduct of the board was not

CHAPTER

3

HOW SHOULD MANAGEMENT REACT TO MARKET CHANGES
Introduction to

Key Corporate Functions and Their

Basic Control Mechanisms
Increasingly, shareholders are reexamining their relationship with their firms'

executives.

This relationship

seems

feature at present
to shareholders.

to

this

known

as corporate governance.

IBM

to avoid extensive

waste and compromise of their market

carefully scrutinized

by the shareholders

presumably would not have happened.

What

is vital

for

an

ideal

system of corporate governance

management, especially the CEO, enough freedom
that such

management uses

However, the management,
take reasonable risks.

due

common

and General Motors failed to tackle looming

management had been

If their

Its

be that managers have become insufficiently accountable

For example,

problems quickly enough
positions.

is

to the fact that

its

freedom

to

manage

in order to focus

to

manage well and

in the interests

on the

give the

is to

interest

of shareholders.

of shareholders, has to

Generally, corporate officers are risk averse.

some

risky business decisions will end

judicial second guessing of business decisions.

When

to ensure

up

This

in failure

is

mainly

and the

courts try to second guess

business decisions and impose liability for negligence, corporate officers will be

36

37

Some

reluctant to take risky business decisions.
interests

time this situation affects the

of the shareholders and stagnates the growth of the corporation.

In order to avoid or minimize such behavior by

by the

less interference

courts.

However,

if there is

as to a business decision, courts should be free to
In practice, the courts

negligence.
reliance

on the business judgment

seem
rule.

to

management, there should be
ample evidence of negligence

impose

liability for

minimize director

Under

171

such

through

liability

this rule, courts will not

examine the

substantive merits of the business decisions that are not accompanied by conflict of

and recklessness.

interest, illegality

While court doctrine seems

172

to favor managerial discretion, hostile tender offers

of corporate managers to pursue growth maximizing policies that

restrict the ability

are unprofitable to shareholders.

Thus, corporate restructuring by large corporations

has become a trend in order to avoid the danger of becoming a takeover target. The

managements of

large firms fear that if their

they would soon

become takeover

corporations

173

The

.

classic

targets.

examples of

companies are

inefficiently

Hence, they try to

this strategy are

IBM

down

managed

size their

and General

Motors Corp.
This chapter focuses on
securities markets signal

examined:

IBM

how management of

a

company should

poor performance of the company.

Two

Corp and General Motors Corp. The main cause

react,

new

share in almost

171

all

products to the market as rapidly as

of

its

its

the

examples are
for

IBM's

downfall was that the management failed to pay attention to the market.
in introducing

when

It

delayed

competitors, thus loosing

major markets. Consequently, the share prices of the

WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOHN C.COFFEE, JR, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE,
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, at 139 (Fourth edition 1990).

m Id.

m

at

Id. at

140
162

38

company

started sliding

down and

investors began to lose confidence in the

company. Ultimately, the management realized the need
styles

and operating methods

in four

management

to overhaul its

of the corporation's major functions:

production, distribution, finance, and competition. This chapter considers

all

four

aspects by focusing on the examples in the context of basic features of the

corporate governance model.
In economics, production function

between firm inputs and outputs.

is

commonly termed

as the relationship

The production function of a company

is

primarily handled by the production managers or individual officers. In most
publicly held corporations,
product.

The team

it is

a

common

consist of persons

feature to

form teams

to

produce a

from various departments of the corporation

such as market assessment, product planning, styling, advanced engineering and
factory operations.

departments.
product.

new

The team members

Further, the

The team has a

product and get

it

team

leader,

is

retain their ties to their functional

solely responsible for the success or failure of the

whose

basic function

fully into production.

it

will be

worked on by

the project will not be successful.

to design

The members of

under the control of the team leader, otherwise
to another,

is

if

a project

totally different

the

and engineer a

team are clearly

moves from one

people in each department and

174

Distribution can be considered as various routes a product takes as

from manufacturer
all

to the ultimate

division

consumer.

A

channel of distribution

it

travels

is

made up

intermediaries that ultimately place products into the hands of the consumers.

Distribution channels typically include an independent producer that manufactures
the products, wholesalers that
locations,

174

i.e.

agents.

buy the product and

The agents do not take

JAMES P. WOMACK, DANIEL T.
CHANGED THE WORLD, at 112,114, (1990).

title

distribute

it

to various selling

to the products but facilitate

JONES, DANIEL ROOS,THE

MACHINE THAT
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that get the products to various selling locations.

exchanges
distribution

is

the retailer.

consumer. Each

The

The

member of

retailer offers the

consists of officers

who have

final aspect

maximize

company should be handled by

greatest

knowledge

of

product for sale to the ultimate

the distribution channel seeks to

distribution function of a

The

in marketing.

175

profit.

a division which

When

a

company

produces products which caters to different needs of the consumers, there should be
separate divisions of distribution to handle the needs of the consumers. This
especially true for a

income consumer

who

company

that

produces automobiles catering to both a high

and a lower income consumer

that prefers a luxurious, costly car

Thus, companies like

prefers a handy, convenient small car.

distribution channels

is

GM

have

which concentrate on high income consumers and have

separate distribution channels for lower income consumers.

When

considering the function of finance in a corporation, attention often

focuses on

common

The finance

stock and bonds or debentures as well as internal cash flows.

section of a

company

is

mainly monitored by the independent auditor

of the company. In most publicly held corporations, apart from independent auditor,
there will be an audit committee of the

The

audit committee

is

mostly comprised of outside

The primary function of

audit committee

is

to see that the

performance of such auditor.
directors.

Board of Directors which oversees the

independent

auditor evaluates a steady flow of the corporation's financial data and submits that
for review for the audit committee. Further,

members of

have a financial background or understanding
reports

and make sure proper controls are

company

approved by the board and decides on the

175

to provide critical assessments

in place.

deals with most major investments.

It

capital

PAUL A. ARGENTI, THE PORTABLE
BUSINESS COMPANION, at 153.

the audit committee should

The finance

of

section of the

undertakes projects which are

needed for such projects.

MBA DESK REFERENCE AN ESSENTIAL

40

modern

In

days, markets for products change rapidly. This

increased competitors in the market.
is

faster than before

of

its

its

mainly due to

The introduction of new products

to the

and hence the company should adopt strategies which

the needs of the markets and

analyze

is

competitors, that

competitors. This

is

which are
is,

least costly.

company has

the

market

reflect

The company should constantly

to evaluate the intents

commonly termed "competitor

and actions

analysis". Primarily,

competitor analysis focuses on existing capabilities and strategies of competitors.

Although
helpful.

this type

What

of information

actually the

is fairly

easy to obtain,

management should do

is to

it

not always the most

is

focus on probable future

actions of competitors such as future goals and assumptions about market trends.

However, many managers tend
difficult but in

many

suppliers, distributors

cases

it is

to feel that obtaining this type

readily available

and sub contractors

176

from company's

is

sales forces,

Furthermore, a company should

.

who have

have a committee which consists of officers
to constantly

of information

specialized skill in marketing

monitor the market place. The primary function of the committee

should be to focus on

how

new

fast the

products are introduced to the market and

the characteristics of such products.

When

a

company

introduces a

new

the senior executives or the officers'

by

project, initially the plan will be prepared

management committees. Later

executives submit the plan to the board for

initial

approval.

the senior

The board considers

the

project by consulting major divisions of the corporation such as production for

product design, finance for capital estimates to implement the project, and
distribution for information regarding the marketability

However, the general trend by the board

is

of the new product.

to appoint a special

committee

to gain

information from the above mentioned divisions and require such committee to

176

ARGENTI

supra note 174

at

104,105

41

prepare an evaluation report on the pros and cons of implementing the project.
Finally, the board gives

initiated the project

project,

it

approval based on the evaluation report prepared by the

Further, if financial or ethical conflicts arise

special committee.

who

its

between officers

and the board members evaluating implementation of the

on

will be placed before the board

conflicts of interest to resolve the

conflict.

Thus, the four major functions of the corporation (production, finance,
distribution,competition) will be influenced by the groups of governance bodies of
the corporation such as the board of directors, officer

compensation committees,and committee on conflicts of interest

audit, nomination,

in

management committees,

an interactive and hierarchical manner.

IBM

The Problems of Corporate

(International Business Machines Corp):

Culture and High Margin Product Dependence
1991 was a disastrous year for

IBM

world's biggest computer manufacturer.

company booked

a

"

Corp (herein
It's sales

2.8 billion loss, the first in

In order to prevent further losses, the

after referred to as

dropped considerably

its

company was

nearly 80 year
reorganized.

employees

retired

units"

from

and

its

their jobs

work

(13% of

reorganization process did not produce

worse than the previous year.
$5.5 billion".

the

much

was reduced.

work

gain.

force).

The main

Information

to cut

its

Week Feb

01,

dividend.

1993

" 1

the
177

feature

3 quasi-

Nearly 40,000

However, the

The following year of 1992 was

The company's "books were

The board was forced

Reversal of Fortune,

force

and

history."

of the reorganization process was that the company was divided into

autonomous business

IBM), the

still

showing a

loss

of

Moreover, the company

sec; special report; at

28.

42
reorganized

its

management,

firing inefficient executives

and hiring competent

personnel and ultimately John F. Akers was removed from his chairmanship

This catastrophe could not be attributed to under investment because
invested

more than $50

billion over the past

more than any other company
"steadily losing share

what caused
view

its

that the

in the world.

and leadership

downfall?

Many

company was "run

change

its attitude,

However,the company has been
of

its

ground by

its

salespersons.

Hence

major markets".

former and present employees of

management dominated mostly by

IBM

decade in research and development,

in almost all

into

IBM

echo the

top management," a

The management was

the attitude of not grabbing the opportunities of

reluctant to

tomorrow and

firmly sticking to a twenty year old main frame technology. This reluctance

dominated by unhealthy reverence

in its core business, the

instance, originally the introduction of the

gain leadership in the

mainly due

new PC market

to the fact that the

178

main frame business. For

PC by IBM was

but failed to maintain

management gave

was

a success.
its

It

managed

leadership. This

priority to the "old cash

cow

to

is

the

mainframe computer and subordinated the new and rapidly growing PC
business.

179

technology.

Consequently, the company failed to
Further, the

company was

make any break through

in

reluctant to face the revolutionary changes

taking place in the computer industry, although most of the changes were originated

IBM's own

in the

laboratories.

180

178

Id.

179

at

A

Peter F. Drucker, Drucker on

Management :The five deadly business

sins. Wall. St J 21

oc 1993

18
180

Id.

virtues of

The development of RISC can be taken as a good example. Although failed to realize the
RISC, other companies stated to develop RISC based computers which were very fast and

inexpensive.

43

The cause
370

(a

for

IBM's downfall can be

traced far back in 1970,

when System/

modified version of System/360) was introduced into the market.

happened

in the midst

of a recession and the product

IBM

market as expected.

failed.

181

This

did not capture the

It

responded with a massive project, replacing System/370

with F/S (future system) which cost "hundreds of millions of dollars on a vast range

of hardware and software projects".

182

However when

System/370's sales increased considerably, making
product ever.

IBM

This was a hard lesson for

division's designers

were

tied

up

in

it

the recession ended,

IBM's most

because "almost

F/S for the

first

all

management was

stagnated the development of

"coordinating role,

technologies.

interaction of

It is

a

classic

frames.

that

However, the RISC was a

mainframe division did not show any

the introduction of

interest in

were

fifty

threat to

adopting

up processing.

times faster than the

System/370 and hence
it.

Later, after

had entered the personal computer market, the RISC team introduced

181

/^.System/360 was introduced by Thomas

corp. System/3 60

is

more

like

a

memory

J.

Watson

RISC,

conceptualizing the

that radically speeds

The RISC team introduced prototype computers

the

A

new way of

computer hardware and software

IBM's big main

into a

184

183

this

The board withdrew

was

attitude after F/S

Instruction Set Computing.

to competitors.

make any changes and

reluctant to

allowing bureaucratic routine to flourish."

example of the management's

Reduced

its

of the mainframe

half of the decade, and a whole

370 development cycle was missed," giving a major opportunity
After F/S, the

successful

IBM

PC

Jr,son of the founding father

of

IBM

system which can be used to solve almost any

storage

commercial computing problems.
182

183

Id.

Reversal offortune, supra note 168

at 28.

Id. CHARLES H. FERGUSON, CHARLES R.MORRIS, COMPUTER WARS, HOW THE
WEST CAN WIN A POST IBM WORLD. Part at 89 (1993). F/S was considered to be IBM's
184

1

shook top management confidence and created a wariness and animosity toward
centrally driven solutions on the part of product divisions
"Quiet Vietnam".

It

44
microprocessors, which were "ten times quicker than the processors

IBM was

This product was also not adopted because of the cautious attitude of the

using."

top management.

185

was undertaken by

Presumably, the decision to proceed with the

who were

senior executives

in

RISC

project

charge of the research and

development division and subsequently placed before the board for approval.
Objections must have been raised

board meeting regarding the

at the

implementation of the project, since the ultimate decision not to proceed with the
project

would have

to

have been taken by the

However, the company could not
early 1980's the

project

was

full

board.

totally ignore the

RISC's

capabilities. In the

company "launched two major RISC development

for a mini

computer family (Fort Knox)

desk top workstation called "Olympiad."

186

projects,

and the other project for a

These projects did not get the favor

and support from the other divisions, especially the mainframe and the
divisions.

"The divisions

choose to proceed with the projects

that did

immediately subjected to coordinative salvos from every side."
projects did not last long.

lost

discover

to

its

virtues".

188

Mips Computer, Hewlett-Packard,
to

its

Many companies
Silicon Graphics

market RISC based computers which were very

185

Id.

ruin the

The management had the

PC

fear that the

PC
were

The two RISC
in

every thing.

Although the creator of RISC did not favor

began

187

The company spent more than $100 million

implementing the two projects and

one

adoption, other "researchers

including

Sun Micro Systems,

and Digital Equipment began
fast

and inexpensive. Markets for

new microprocessors

will

be a failure like F/S and will

market.

186

Id.
187

Id.

FURGUSON, MORRIS,

supra note 178.01ympiad managed to pervert

RISC

sufficiently to

produce a slow, dull and expensive workstation that nobody bought. Fort Knox tried to bridge the

minicomputer and workstation architectures under amass of conflicting imperatives and
putout of
188

its

misery.

Reversal offortune, supra note 168

at

28.

it

was quickly

45
these computers increased rapidly which finally led

competitive

RISC

product, the

reflects the attitude

new

RS/6000 work

IBM

station.

189

of the whole management structure.

to launch a

The above

By

new

situation

refusing to face up to

technological changes which were happening in the computer industry, the

company missed

the opportunity to dominate "one of the critical

technologies of the

computer

1990V" 90

The introduction of

IBM

PC,

in 1981,

was a

success.

191

captured half the

It

market, the sales were skyrocketing and the entire operation was so smooth.
profits earned

by

PC

sales in

1984 was $4

not last long. In years following 1984, the
standards.

money on

Its

share of the

every machine

market was that

must have

the

192

company

However

this success did

started to lose control over

market shrank considerably and the "company

sold."

193

The primary motive behind entering

to take firm control over the

felt that if

to survive in the

it

PC

billion.

company

The

the

PC

lost

PC

main frame business. Thus the board

fails to enter the

PC

market,

it

may

not be able

mainframe business. The management dominated mostly by senior

executives initiated the

PC

project and the board presumably approved the project

by appointing a special committee

to evaluate the successfulness

of the

PC

business.

The primary blunder with IBM PC production was
suppliers for standard components.
selected outside suppliers, the

189

Id.
190

Id.
191

id.

m ld.
193

Id.

The

selection itself

the selection of outside

was not a blunder but having

company never made an attempt

to take firm control

46
over them.

194

Most importantly

"Microsoft" which supplied

components

IBM

cut

cycle.

to

DOS

finally beat

IBM's own attempt

Consequently

to

based on the

386 chip, which

agreement with

The same year
Under

Intel.

method, and speed of product

relationship between

IBM

IBM

IBM

its

198

The decision

Microsoft would have been a tougher decision for the

members

194

gone

make, and

However,

IBM

view of not

full

where

it

board. There must have

from the technical

interested in furthering

to collaborate

this

197

to the point

its

appears that the board had ignored in views of some of

(that is the

to sell

to collaborate with

for such collaboration(especially

community) because Microsoft was always
it

to

to similarly unfortunate

became

However,

computing for the

to bureaucratic inertia.

and Microsoft lead

most dangerous competitor.

market with a "PC

chip making technology.

much revenue due

IBM

had the right

Microsoft constantly "outfought and outthought"

.

to

entered into a major technology sharing

events.

been objections raised

IBM

set the standard for business

the agreement,

attempt also failed to produce

The

quality,

of losing control of the microprocessor standard

designs in return for important

intel

supply IBM-Standard

clone makers", which regularly under

Compaq, another PC producer, beat

as

196

on

left free to

develop microprocessor was a flop.

became imminent

next five years."

IBM PC

IBM

in 1986, the risk

Intel

which supplied microprocessors and the

software "were

an entire industry of

on price and

195

"Intel"

own
its

business

own

with Microsoft).

Reversal offortune, supra note 168 at 28. The decision to select outsiders would have presumably
The board having gained all relevant information must have realized the time

to the full board.

frame within which the project had to be implemented
195

Reversal offortune, supra note 168

felt

it

necessary to select outside suppliers.

at 28.

196

Id.
197

Id.

198

Id.

IBM's "not invented here" mentality was

so strong and this prevented the use of Intel designs.

47

By
was

IBM

1983,

upgraded

later

to

CP/286 and then

programs, but included

function

that

is

simultaneously.

it

to

alternative, called

CP/386 or CP/X86

CP/X86 was compact,

generations of Intel chips."

DOS

DOS

developed an internal

many

functions that

efficient

DOS

code that could run

did not have.

Another project called Mermaid, allowed users

Windows

CP/X86 was

portable since

run exclusively on Intel processors".
all

the virtues of

3.0,

in

run programs by

to

This program

which was

was written

it

language which could run on any processor,

With

One such

could run two separate programs in different windows

equalled the potentials of Microsoft's
Further,

which

for" subsequent

clicking at pictures rather than typing instructions altogether.

1990.

CP/86

an

at least in theory.

later

introduced in

IBM

software

"DOS was

written to

'"

CP/X86, the IBM's top management decided

to

choose

a system called OS/2 with the collaboration of Microsoft and to scrap CP/X86. This
decision created turmoil in the
that Microsoft

suggest that

was gaining

IBM,

IBM

technical

control over

community and

IBM's PC

business.

reflected the reality

Some commentators

instead of collaborating with Microsoft, "could easily have

collaborated with one of Microsoft's eager competitors, Lotus or

develop and market the

new

system."

The development of OS/2 was
to

200

also a

develop the system due to countless

part of

rough road.

IBM

It

took more than three years

bureaucratic interventions.

The worst

development was the decision to write OS/2 almost entirely in 286

"assembly language."
the 286.

199

Borland to help

A

A

software language tied specifically to the internal layout of

286 assembler program

Reversal offortune, supra note 168

200

Id.

is

a "complicated code, hard to write, hard to

at 28.

always limited to

test,

had performance

Intel chips,

and because of

inferior to the 286's

much

its

strong ties to the 286 standard,

superior successors".

After the introduction of OS/2, the relations between

was

so strained that a breakup
its

business, diligently

worked on windows

286 assembler).

IBM was

took nearly five years

It

from the 286 assembler.

as a direct competitor to OS/2.

left

at

Upon

with a useless system (OS/2 written in

a cost of $1 billion to get OS/2 free

IBM

In early 1992,

and Microsoft were

Microsoft, solely interested in furthering

inevitable.

dissolution of their relationship

IBM

201

released a

new

product OS/2 2.0,

which gained some modest commercial success but not a match

for Microsoft's

windows.

Thus

IBM

been reduced

PC

created the
to a

segments of the

industry but failed to gain control over

commodity manufacturer,

PC

alienated

it.

It

had

from the most profitable

industry.

The Need For Restructuring:
In order to regain

whole

need

to restructure the

ago

but at a slow pace.

Jr.,

dominant position

its

John

cutting process

the

company

201

202

200

the

had

to

be accelerated.

to accelerate the

company's cost

by shrinking the workforce as well as eliminating under utilized
202

In 1993, nearly 47,000 workers left

Laurie Hays, Mitchell Pacelle,

WALL

ST.

J.

May

9,

and

at 28.

IBM
1994

IBM

Eleven thousand employees will leave their

intends to reduce more.

Reversal offortune, supra note 168

million,

felt

Akers was replaced by Louis V. Gerstner

new chairman was

buildings and nonstrategic assets.
the

F.

the latter felt that the restructuring process

The primary focus of

IBM

This restructuring process began several years

setup.

When

computer industry,

in

sells its

at

B3.

New

York office Tower to Real Estate Group for

49

when

jobs

of IBM's Federal System

the sale

computing system

for uncle

However, the primary

Co (which develops complex

Sam.) to Loral Corp

completed.

is

step towards restructuring

product groups to reflect the market's

was

shift to client/server

203

to "divide the

company's

computing, that

is

using

powerful "servers" to feed data and programming to desktop "clients" such as
personal computers".

204

The company grouped mainframes, minicomputers and

high end work stations and other related software into a single

While

IBM

Personal Computer

of responsibility was designed

Co was
to

created to handle the clients.

low cost and easy

handle the

to handle.

company divided

market, the

PC

in

fast

The decision

Presumably

growing market, the

to divide

distribution

PC market which

in order to revert its attention to

the responsibilities and

PC

formed a separate division

to

business.

The new management of

company

205

would have been mainly influenced by the functions of

and competition. The company ignored a
is

This division

enhance the marketing of client /server systems by

specializing sales forces and distribution channels.
responsibilities

server group.

the later group

is

eager to actively involve the

consumer markets associated with the "emergence

of the so called

information superhighway, where the biggest growth opportunities will be in
206
equipping consumers with hardware and services for the digital deluge".
Mr.

Richard Thoman,
to

its

chief executive,

manage an IBM product

chief of

is

the first executive

from outside the industry

The appointment of Mr.Thoman

business.

IBM's personal computer company was management's boldest

203

as the

new

effort to

Evan Ramstead, IBM, and Former Employer, Remember Year of Upheaval, The San Francisco
Examiner Jan 3, 1994 at CI.
204

205

206

Ira Sager,

Id.

Id

IBM

Reboots

-

Bit

by Bit

,

Business

Week

Jan 17, 1994 at 82.
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dismantle IBM's entrenched culture, which

manage

especially reluctant to introduce outsiders to

new management

is

intensely focusing

Mr.Thoman

the appointment of

IBM's mainframe business

same period a year

to the introduction

earlier".

make changes and

their business. Further, the

on capturing the consumer market and hence

is

a positive step towards success.

is

showing a

"mainframe revenues were 12% lower
the

very reluctant to

is

208

The decline

of personal computers.

use smaller computers at a lower cost.

The company's

slight decline.

in the first quarter
in

of 1994 compared

mainframe market

Many companies found

Hence

207

partly due

is

it

with

convenient to

in order to stabilize its

market for

mainframes the company introduced a new mainframe system, the new "mainframes
are

powered by anywhere from two

new technology
it

easier for users to manipulate the
It

one in the mainframe market."

More
Intel

over,

IBM

is

based on the Power

PC

its

closest competitors

by

also

makes

IBM

still

at least five

210

trying to establish

Corp's microprocessors."

it

"power and capacity". 209 However,

"out sells

The

linked together".

not only reduces "the physical size of the computer",

leads in the mainframe market.
to

to 192 microprocessors

It

chips that

"RISC

architecture as an alternative

intends to introduce
it is

new

to

personal computers

developing with Apple and Motorola Inc.

However, the company may have a problem of convincing important business
customers that the future prospects for
conventional PCs.

207

08

still

Ira Sager,

211

supra note 198

at

82

it

out in the Mainframe Market, Maclean

Id

2]0

Id.

211

kind of PCs are far greater than the

Daly, John, The Remains of The Day: Small Computers Are all the

Battling
209

this

Ira Sager,

supra note 199

at 82.

May

2,

1994

at

Rage but Manufacturers are

v 107, p 37.
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In the middle of 1994,

new

IBM,

as a part of

plan which considerably changes

main focus of

the plan

is

"marketing and sales structure".

its

company's primary

to organize the

industry instead of geography.

restructuring process, introduced a

its

The new

structure enables the

212

sales people

The

by

company's account

executives to report directly to the industry group heads instead of top branch

This

managers.

is

The company

one way of reducing massive layers of bureaucracy.
set

up a board sub-committee

The main goal of

corporate governance.

this

213

to primarily handle matters

sub-committee

is to

of

improve relations

with shareholders. Further, the sub-committee has some duties of a traditional

nominating committee; that

is

new

nominating

directors, considering shareholder

recommendations for new members, reviewing board

size

and composition,

supervising the company's position on public responsibility issues, and considering
outside director pay and retirement policies

However
soul";

its

the toughest and

215

reshaping IBM's "heart and

The new management

seven decades of culture.

are reluctant to accept

Nearly

insists that the

40%

They

the need for change.

The new chairman

urgency for change.

.

critical task lies in

"entrenched patriarchal culture".

difficulties in dismantling

managers

most

214

realizes the

of

IBM

fail to realize

ST.

J.

Bart Ziegler,

IBM plans

May

at

6 1994

to

revamp sales structure

to focus

the

company should primarily
216

focus on the market place, not "employee policies and basic beliefs".

212

top

on

industries, not

geography,

WALL

n87 at7

(July-

IBM

culture

A3.

2,3

Id.

214

Theodore Jadick, Board committee
August 1994)
215

,

Laurie Hays, Blue Period: Gerstner

WALL
216

Id.

ST.

J

May

13,

1994

at

Al.

is

trends,

15 corporate board

struggling as he tries to change ingrained

52

General Motors Corp:

The Problems of Multi-Layered, Multi-Division

Management:
The debacle of General Motors Corp has some
The main

IBM.

due

culture that

that both

is

changing market place.

to the rapidly

mainly

similarity

to

is

new

companies

failed to introduce

The

of General Motors Corp

failure

cash shortage, but the failure of
not attuned to speed".

debacle of

similarities to the

IBM

is

products
is

mainly due to "management

217

General Motors Corp's share of the U.S car market has been on the decline for
a long time.

Until 1991, the board of directors

was

poor performance.

It

some hard

218

realities".

car market declined to 34 percent.

management

structure but

it

make changes,

appointed

219

$7 billion that year.

Its

share of the

The board demanded rapid changes

was ignored by

former chairman Bob Stempel.
to

lost

company's

board gradually "came to terms with

in late 1991, the

The company

failed to realize the

the top

management, especially by the

Dispirited by the consistent apathy of

the board acted

on

its

own.

On

in the

management

April 6th 1992, the board

Jack Smith as the President and "entrusted him with fixing one of the

most intransigent companies

in

America".

Bob Stempel was

forced to resign in

October 1992 and he was replaced by John Smale and President Jack Smith added
the

title

of Chief Executive Officer.

restructuring process

220

The new management

accelerated the

which began under former Chairman Stempel.

It

mainly

focused on dismantling the "kind of organizational complexities that have frozen the

217

Warren Brown, Frank Swoboda, For GM, A Makeover

New Model
218

Development, The Washington Post, April

Maryann

219

Id

220

Id.

Keller,

GM's Road

to Revolt,

4,

is

1993

Measured
at

The Plain Dealer,

in Years;

Cash Crunch Slows

HI.

Dec

26, 1993

at

1G
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company

in the past".

221

The

step towards restructuring

first

General Motors "clutter of operating divisions

American Operations
Buick

and

was

to reorganize

to create a unified

North

Cadillac, Chevrolet, Oldsmobile, Pontiac

Structure".

and

function as marketing organizations but production, design and

still

purchasing are

all

under one umbrella".

American Strategy Board"

to

222

it

created a "single North

handle policy decisions and "abolished a tangle of

The main purpose of

executive committees."

Earlier policy decisions

policy decisions.

Further,

which took weeks or even months.

had

creating such a board
to pass

was

to speed

up

through various committees,

After the creation of Strategy Board, the

decisions get approval within two or three days.

223

The company's product development needed an urgent overhaul.
has used platform teams which consist of

members from

The company

engineering, design,

finance, purchasing and marketing, for the production of cars etc. for nearly a

decade.

224

However,

members were
engineering

still

its

approach was impeded by bureaucracy.

beholden

member was answerable

member was answerable
had

to coordinate

members had
issues".

to their respective fields.

designs

"rigid areas

among

its

For instance, the

to the engineering colossus

to the verticle

purchasing structure.

many marketing

The team

and purchasing

Further, teams often

divisions and various

team

of control and the right to overrule other members on key

That led to frequent changes that complicated the designs and added

manufacturing costs.

225

The decision

to

form teams

initially

would have been

prepared by senior executives or the officers of the production division and placed

221

Kathleen Kerwin, James

Smith fix GM,
222

Id.
223

B. Treece, David Woodruff, Kevin Kelly, Michael Oneal,

Week Nov

1,

1993

at 126.

214.

Kerwin, Treece, Woodruff, Kelly, Oneal, supra note 214.

224

Id.
225

at

Business

Id.

Can Jack
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However without providing

before the board for approval.

would not have provided much

to handle a project independently, the project

The new management created a

greater freedom to teams

twenty

single purchasing office to replace

seven separate purchasing divisions. That finally realized the "leverage of

enormous purchasing
company's

the

The management was able

clout".

annual materials

bill

by demanding "double

distrust

among

the suppliers.

The introduction of low
For instance,

problems.

ashtray) supplied by a

-

Buick Roadmaster production".

them

Hence

failed quality tests.

with high

cost.

production

It

from

created

plant, a part (an

cost parts

company had

parts

the

ill

to

buy

company missed

of

its

was

fitting

down of

that half

of

from other suppliers

third quarter

widespread problems in

its

That delayed the delivery of urgently needed 1994 models and

GM's

share of the U.S car market to 29 percent in September 1993.
in order to reduce costs,

1992 the company reduced corporate
reduce more as

227

favorable.

The problem with low

by 95,000 vehicles because

The management,

22b

digit price cuts

par supplier caused a "six weeks shut

Further, in 1993 the

target

factories".

decreased

227

was not always

company's Arlington

new Sub

shave $4 billion from

226

cost parts

at the

GM's

This created enormous animosity

suppliers" and eliminating high cost contracts.

and

to

gain.

it still

has excess

staff

staff.

229

began eliminating workforce.

from 13,500

to

about 2,500 but

it

228

In

has to

Moreover, as part of the cost cutting

Id
Kerwin, Treece, Woodruff, Kelly, Oneal, supra note 214.

228

Id.

Engineering problems on the production

production of two

assembly
229

Id.

company

in five

new engines

at the

line,

labor problems, faulty testing equipments halted

company's Tonawada engine

plant, that in turn

handicapped car

other plants.

After reducing 20,000 white collar workers during 1991 and 1992, according to analysts, the
still

has

25% more

than

it

needs.

55

management has begun

process, the

to sell

its

non

3 billion in annual sales.

noncore business totaling

The whole idea behind General Motors Corp's

company

the

company

a "leaner, quicker manufacturer."

will not

harder leaner system, that

has listed

230

restructuring process

Under

make

is to

this leaner system, the

arise.

232

The managers must be clever enough
is

to

cope with the

they will have to weigh risks and respond quickly

In order to achieve this goal, the managers

"develop a clear sense of purpose which

company" 233

It

have the "buffers of extra inventory and plant capacity to

compensate for mistakes."

when problems

231

strategic assets.

is

must

absent in large sectors of the

Presumably, a special committee (which was formed to monitor the

.

market) would have played a major role in introducing the leaner system. The board
before giving approval should have required information from production and
distribution divisions to see the feasibility of introducing such a system.

However, the company
price increase

of consumer

due

to the

is

showing signs of recovery.

on Japanese cars and also working

tastes

from Japanese models

to

in the

This

is

partly

due

company's favor

American models.

The

is

to the

the shift

shift is partly

improved quality of American models. The U.S car and truck market

is

growing again, "buoyed by economic recovery and improved consumer confidence".

The company

is

also

helped by cost cutting and the introduction of cars such as

Saturn and Cadillacs (which have high performing engine systems) that are better in
quality and style.

230

234

Id

231

Id.

2n
233

Id.

Kerwin, Treece, Woodruff, Kelly, Oneal, supra note 214.

234

Id.
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The Need

for

Changes

in the Relationship

Between The Board of Directors and

Corporate Officers.

IBM

The study of
to

and General Motors Corp

market place, the companies must radically

in a rapidly evolving

compete

reflect the situation that in order

methods and management

restructure their manufacturing

styles.

For instance,

General Motors Corp realized that in order to compete with other auto makers, such

Co and

as Chrysler Corp, Ford

in particular the Japanese,

it

has to abandon

That

production techniques and copy the Japanese system of lean production.

mass

its

is

using less resources (inventory, labor, factory space and investment) and creating

team work.
full

235

Speed

also an important element, because the

is

market

always

is

of competitors. "If you are not faster than your competitor, you are in a tenuous

position,

and

if

you're only half as

manufacturing expert.

236

However

of the bureaucracy, in making

it

fast,

you're terminal" said George Stalk, a

the core problem lies in changing the attitude

realize the

need for change and the urgency for

change.

when

Further,

company depends on high margin products

a

mainframe computers) while the market

work

stations)

company may

it

will affect the

lose

its

market share.

faster than before

This
its

is

mainly due to the

new

is

the policy

precisely the

market for

fact that

products to the market

and hence the company must adopt
That

More

product decreases.

before, the introduction of

needs of the market.

example IBM's

low margin products (such as

growth of the company.

securities declines as the markets for

As mentioned

shifts to

(for

strategies

which

is

now

reflect the

makers of the company, primarily the board

of directors and senior managers must cope with the market by introducing new

35

WALL
236

Paul Ingrassia,

ST.

J.

Timothy

Competition,

Oct

Car Makers Who Go By The Book Swap More and Bigger for Fewer and Smaller,
1,

1992

at

A 12.

D. Schellhart, Carol Hymowitz,

WALL

ST.

J.

May

2,

The Second Century: U.S Manufacturers Gird for

1989, sec: Economy.
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products as rapidly as
technology.
alter

its

Further, the

competitors.

This can be achieved by using sophisticated

management should

initiate

programs and processes

to

production and distribution to suit the preferences and pockets of the

consumers.

The management when

challenges of

its

competitors.

for the success of the

programs should consider the

initiating

Monitoring the market and

company.

special committees should focus

Hence

the

its

competitors

is

essential

management, especially by appointing

on the how competitors function

in the

market and

see whether competitors are undercutting or not.

When

a

company forms

alliances with outside suppliers, there should be

sufficient provisions in the contract regarding the quality of the product

intending to purchase.

it is

Further, there should be provisions in the contract

preventing the company's technology from being robbed or leaking out.

In the case

of non-performance or inadequate performance by the supplier, the purchaser
should have the right to terminate the contract or withhold payment.
alliancing with competitors (such as

opportunistic temptation.
party

is

The

trust

IBM

Further

and Microsoft) lead naturally

and good

faith collaboration

subject to abuse if one party behaves selfishly.

expected of each

This can be avoided or

reduced by making provisions in the contract for reciprocal penalties.
party does any
too.

Hence

damages

to the other party, the

the interaction of the

damage

to

will be

management of a company,

done

That

is if

one

to that party

especially the board

of directors and board committees should focus on the market change, the
competitors, product innovation, and deficiencies in forming alliances with outside
suppliers.

CHAPTER

4

CONCLUSION

A

"corporation"

is

a team of contracts with a centralized decision making body

which constantly rewrites the terms of the
centralized decision
success.

A

making body

is vital

multi constituency board

is

contract.

The composition of the
and

for a corporation's functions

ideal for a corporation.

its

For instance, a

board consisting of stockholders, senior executives and outside directors seems
optimal because these constituencies have greater incentive to achieve a high level

of efficiency for the corporation as a whole.
stockholders,

it

and hence they

try to hold diversified portfolios rather than concentrate

example, some

may

on one or

Thus, shareholders lack the incentive to be actively involve in

managing the corporation.

benefits),

of

will not be beneficial because generally shareholders dislike risk

few corporations.

(for

If a board consists purely

may

Moreover, divergence of interests among shareholders

prefer instant profits and others

may

prefer longterm

create disagreement in implementing corporate strategies.

Unrestricted salability of stocks also allows stockholders to escape from corporate
policies with

which they

disagree.

However, inclusion of top Managers or senior executives on the board provides
gains to the corporation because they gain easy access to information and hence
their decisions are

more informed and can be

daily operations of the business

competition

among

is far

relied

upon

as their involvement with

greater than the others.

If there

is

top managers themselves, then they are the best ones to
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dominate the board of
after gaining control

of the board.

security holders rather than
to shirk

and

However, senior executives may not be

directors.

this shirking

They may tend

compete with each

their reputations

liability

other.

wealth of the

They may have

the tendency

can be constrained best by outside directors. Outside

directors have the incentive to monitor the

poor managers because

to expropriate the

faithful,

if the

management

efficiently

company performs poorly under

and

to discipline

their monitorship,

and future employability are impaired, not to mention increased

from shareholder and creditor

The most important function of

suits.

the board of directors

is

to

monitor the

Effective monitoring depends

performance of the top managers.

on an adequate

and continuing flow of information about the corporation's financial
operations and future strategies.

status, its daily

The information obtained should be from

sophisticated and independent information gathering systems and directors

who

are

equally sophisticated in interpreting both financial and non-financial data.
Further, in order to support the monitoring function of the board,

advantageous to form outside committees.

implement the monitoring function.

It is

a

it is

These committees can effectively

common

practice in publicly held

corporations to form audit, nominating, and compensation committees in order to
effectively

implement the Board's monitoring functions.

primarily consist of outside directors.

However,

These committees

this author suggests that if the

board consists of several constituencies such as stockholders, insiders (senior

managers) and outside directors, the formation of outside committees
necessary and thus

it

reduces monitoring costs.

What

is vital is

may

not be

that in a

competitive environment, monitoring mechanisms which are lower in costs are
likely to survive.

Corporations are not
corporation

is

change.

static.

They

are in motion.

The constant

feature of a

Corporations change their physical structure, they setup

new

60
divisions, acquire another corporation or are being acquired

and they enter or leave markets.
control transactions.
transactions.

These changes are commonly termed as corporate

The board of

directors plays a critical role in corporate control

Directors are said to be fiduciaries to the equity investors and

fiduciary principles require directors to

maximize the wealth of the

principle

may

wealth

one aspect of fiduciary duty, the directors

is

by another corporation,

lead to unequal wealth distribution.

investors. This

Although equal distribution of

may

distribute the wealth

unequally, if unequal distribution maximizes the wealth of the investors as a whole.

Generally shareholders prefer a rule that maximizes the total amount of gains

produced from control transactions and not the method of distribution of such gains.
In a sale of control, where
the board of directors

is to

new

control

becomes

There are a series of cases that

underlying

these cases

directors has a duty in

is that,

in the case

stress this proposition.

The

basis

of sale of a company, the board of

maximizing immediate shareholder value and

several bidders, the board has an obligation to auction the

When

primary duty of

seek the best value reasonably available to the

stockholders.
all

inevitable, the

company

if there are

fairly.

markets for securities show poor signals as to the performance of the

corporation in their respective product or service markets, radical changes in the

manufacturing methods and management styles become inevitable.
strength in their markets, the companies seek to restructure their

and manufacturing methods.

The whole idea behind

electronics and automobile markets

is

recapture

management

the restructuring process

reduce costs and to introduce leaner, quicker manufacturing system.

system was introduced by the Japanese.

To

The success of Japan

in

styles
is

This type of

consumer

mainly due to the leaner manufacturing

system, which requires less of everything including inventory, labor,investments

Under such lean systems,

risks

to

etc.

have to be weighed beforehand and problems have
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to

Production managers will not have extra resources to

be solved quickly.

compensate for mistakes.

Team work

costs.

is

Thus the system must minimize mistakes and reduce

A

also an essential element in this system.

members from varying departments of

companies must speedup

company such

The team

finance, purchasing and marketing.

or failure of the product.

the

Moreover,

is

in order to

their production.

team consists of

as engineering, design,

directly responsible for the success

compete with other competitors,the

This can be achieved by using less

inventory, simple designs, computer technology and less interference from the

bureaucracy. For instance, General Electric Co, in order to compete with other

competitors especially Germany's Seimen

production of circuit breaker boxes.

It

AG, completely

boxes.

It

its total

parts to 1,275

company eliminated

a layer of middle managers and entrusted

production workers with those middle management responsibilities.
this restructuring

was

that the production

manufacturing costs decreased.

new

manufacturers strove for steadiness.
238

However,

it

of

circuit breaker

breakthrough in technology.

"Every

new

production was an enormous

new

The markets

™/d.

WALL

ST.

J.

May

The management has

2 1989.

will

change

products will be faster than ever because of the
to

adopt strategies that reflect

Timothy D. Schelhardt, Carol Hymowitz, The Second Century:

Competition

of

boxes increased while

the needs of the market. For instance, one reason for General

237

results

products to the market was slower because

will be different in the future.

constantly, the introduction of

The

237

In the past, introduction of

venture."

from

computerized system that streamlined the production of

installed a

Further, the

its

consolidated the circuit breaker's unit at one

plant and simplified the boxes' design by reducing

28,000.

restructured

Motor Corp's

U.S.

failure

Manufacturers Gird For
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was

that

it

believed that the customers should adapt their needs to the cars

building, rather than

customers.

company producing

is vital

questions at the right time.
oriented."

the corporation

240

make

The

backgrounds, personalities that best

sills,

The board members should possess

needs of the corporation.

"A

true

the opinions of

must constantly evaluate

basic question a board

intuition, logic

The board must take

and

common

evaluate the various practices that finally lead to a

corporate practice, the board must evaluate

MARYANN

240 T

KELLER, COLLISION

Robert A. Bassett, Corporate Law,

at

that

is

its

Or

into consideration

sense to sort through and

more

As

effective board.

effectiveness periodically.

a good

241

248 (1993).

Now

directors are wise to conduct comprehensive

that the Spotlight

is

focused upon board effectiveness,

self-evaluations and consider adopting

THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, December
24]

the skills to ask right

a timely shift in strategy according to the market shifts?

members,

the

fits

measure of board, effectiveness must be

the board surprised by developments?

239

needs of the

have a board of directors comprising

for a corporation is to

of members who have portfolio of

was

reflect the

239

Thus, what

outcome

which

cars

was

it

12,

1994

at

new

procedures.

B4, B7.
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